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Abstract 
Over the past centuries industrialization has played a relevant role in the development of nations, especially 
through its contribution to economic growth and, thus, to raising the standards of living. However, industrial 
development and how it can be influenced by government decisions has been largely ignored in the context of 
disputed or occupied territories with a problem of sovereignty recognition. This paper aims to contribute to 
overcoming this gap, through a methodological approach based on a comparative analysis of the industrial policies 
conducted in four case studies, namely, the experiences of Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, Tibet, and the West Bank 
(Palestine). This comparative approach intends to explore the lessons we can take from these diverse experiences. 
On the one hand, from territories that have achieved a significant degree of success in terms of industrial policies, 
despite suffering on-going disputes, contributing to their evolution from developing to developed territories. On 
the other hand, from territories where the disputes are more severe, raising several obstacles to their industrial 
development, and whose effects it is important to debate and discuss. Our study finds that, in disputed or occupied 
territories, there are some specificities and similarities among the factors that play a significant role in the 
success/failure of their industrial policies to achieve broader development goals. These seem to be: the level of 
political stability and autonomy of the local government in defining and pursuing their development goals; the 
influence of past and current occupations and their strategic orientation (more segregationist or more integrated 
ones); the protectionist orientation especially during the first stages of industrialization; the ability to attract foreign 
investment as a means to transfer innovation and technology to the local economy; and the level of openness of 
the local economy, conjugated with the ability to increase local industrial productivity and competitiveness and 
thus to increase exports.  
Keywords: Industrial Development; Industrial Policies; Occupied Territories; Northern Cyprus; Taiwan; Tibet; 
West Bank    
 
1. Introduction 
The influence of public policies in supporting and promoting industrial growth is anchored in the essential role 
played by manufacturing activities to induce development, given their contribution to economic growth, prosperity, 
and to raising the population’s standard of living (Liang and Mei, 2005). This link between development and the 
industrial sector has been the focus of academic attention over the last few decades. Alexandersson (1967) stated 
that the process of industrialization plays an important role in the advancement of the countries’ economy from 
recession to prosperity. Moreover, a study carried out by Kuznets (1971) showed that there is a strong relationship 
between industrialization and economic performance, allowing countries to evolve from being classified as 
underdeveloped to developed. Also Rostow (1991) specified that industrialization is a prerequisite for growth, and 
a country’s development is linked to the success achieved by its industrialization. These assumptions have 
collected many political supporters who have looked at industry as an essential sector to achieve the development 
of countries, especially after the economic success of some territories and the role of the industrial sector in that 
success.  
Even today, after a phase of intense tertiarization of our societies and economies, many still defend the crucial 
role of industrialization, as a means to strengthen the countries’ economies. In this context, we found wide-spread 
debate on the need for the reindustrialization of current economies (Westkämper and Walter, 2014). In fact, despite 
a phase where government priorities were especially directed at knowledge-based activities, industrial policies 
recently returned to a political agenda driven by dynamics of fear and hope (Aiginger, 2014). Fear of globalization 
because recovery from the recent financial crisis has been especially difficult for countries with a weak 
manufacturing sector; and hope that these policies could help to increase employment opportunities and mitigate 
social problems. Also, Aiginger (2014) mentions that the future of industrial policy should be different than it has 
been in the past, by encouraging competition in a discovery process drawn in a cooperative climate between firms 
and government. This reindustrialization process should be aligned with the interests of society; therefore, he 
suggests a redefinition of industrial policy, changing the method of measuring economic performance through the 
use of a broader set of goals and more comprehensive indicators, beyond GDP goals.  
However, if industrial development policies have been consistently a relevant topic of academic research over 
the past few decades, theoretical insights on industrial development and industrial policy have focused mostly on 
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the most common scenario, countries with a self-running government and no issues of sovereignty recognition. 
But what about those disputed or occupied territories with long-standing conflicts and political instability, where 
local institutions and local firms are limited in their action? Are there achievements in industrial development in 
those territories with sovereignty issues, and have those achievements been contributing effectively to increasing 
social cohesion and economic growth? Based on these research questions, this study is an attempt to contribute to 
overcoming this theoretical gap, as industrial development and how it can be influenced by government decisions 
has been largely ignored in these specific territorial contexts.  
To achieve this goal, we will explore four international experiences, specifically, from Northern Cyprus, 
Taiwan, Tibet, and the West Bank (Palestine). Based on a methodological approach involving a comparative 
analysis, it will be debated how public policies influence industrial development in disputed or occupied territories 
with a problem of sovereignty recognition. The main purpose is to learn from these four experiences, intending to 
move towards more abstract generalizations about the specificities of public policies to favor industrial growth in 
these specific territories. To achieve this goal, an extensive literature review was conducted in a critical and 
selective manner, in order to connect this narrow research topic to the broader existing researches. However, it is 
important to underline that one of the main limitations found in this methodological approach was related with the 
limited academic attention paid to the industrial sector of some of these territories. This is the case of Northern 
Cyprus, for example, which meant discussing its industrial development based on the available sources, some of 
which did not have very updated data.  
The article is organized into three sections. A more conceptual and theoretical initial section that focuses on 
industrial development policies in developing territories. The second and main section examines the learning 
outcomes from successful and unsuccessful experiences of industrial development in disputed or occupied 
territories. On the one hand, insights from territories (rare ones) that, in spite of the dispute that characterizes them, 
have achieved significant success in the field of industrial policies, contributing to their evolution from developing 
to developed territories. On the other hand, it will be examined territories (more common) where the disputes are 
more severe, causing several obstacles to their industrial development, whose effects must be debated and 
discussed. Finally, and based on these case studies, the concluding section will discuss the complex issue of an 
appropriate definition of industrial policy in the specific context of territories with a problem of sovereignty 
recognition.  
 
2. Industrial policies and political stability   
The World Bank (1993) considers industrial policies as government efforts to change a country’s industrial 
structure in order to promote its productivity and growth. In a broader perspective, for the UNCTAD (1998) 
industrial policies are seen as more concerted and conscious efforts on the part of governments to encourage and 
diversify their economies as a whole. This view was previously defended by Rodrick (1995), who stated that 
industrial policy is not only about industry, but it must also target agricultural activities and modern services, 
which are also relevant to raise the efficiency and competitiveness of a country’s industry. According to the author, 
industrial policy is the only way to provide real economic growth and development, by inducing structural change, 
meaning a shift from traditional activities to the production of new services and goods with more added value. To 
achieve this goal, governments have an important role in promoting the structural changes that will favor industrial 
growth, by improving infrastructures, encourage innovation, support technological development, and improve 
human resources development with investments in the education sector (Kniivilä, 2002). 
According to Rowden (2011), developing territories will never be rid of aid assistance and dependency as 
long as they are unable to use industrial policies to transform their domestic industries by enhancing their 
productive capacities, diversifying their economies, and building their own tax system over time. Adelman (2000) 
suggested some measures to bolster the industrial policy of developing countries, such as reducing monopoly 
privileges for specific industries, increasing investment in education and scientific research, using targeted 
subsidies and tax breaks to encourage domestic and foreign direct investment, and investing in physical 
infrastructure. The author further proposed that those governments should impose a protection system for emergent 
industries. 
Razzaque (1997) also stated that an important aspect of industrial policy is not only infrastructure, but that 
those physical investments must be accompanied by parallel improvements, such as political stability, which is 
critical in some developing territories. Taking Bangladesh as an example, the author showed that the presence of 
an unstable political environment was not conducive to development efforts, having thus failed to plan and follow-
up on any of its long-term national economy agendas. The general elections of 1996 put an end to years of political 
stalemate and brought back a degree of political stability to the country, which has reflected on its development. 
The same opinion is shared by Mankiw (1995) when he said that there are several variables affecting investment 
and economic growth in developing countries, but the most important of all these variables is political stability, as 
in several countries growth regression is attributed to phases of political instability. Altenburg (2011) also 
mentioned that one of the main obstacles to industrial growth in developing countries is of a political order. 
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Unstable political systems build on favoritism and a lack of political checks and balances reflects directly on 
industrial policies and negatively affects industrial growth.  
Regarding the relevance of governmental immaterial investments, studies have also confirmed the importance 
of human capital as an engine of economic growth. Hanushek (2013) mentioned that developing territories find it 
difficult to improve economic performance in the long term if they do not improve the quality of education. 
According to Lanjouw and Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001), when industry becomes increasingly more dependent 
on capital-intensive activities and technologies, rather than labor-intensive ones, this will lead to an increase in 
income inequality and poverty rates, especially when its human capital shows low levels of education. 
Focusing still on the potential of government policies to promote industrial competitiveness in developing 
territories, Lazzarini (2015) proposed the support-adjusted sustainable competitive advantage model (SASCA), 
based on the links between industrial policy and competitive advantages. The author stated that the relationship 
between industrial policy and sustainable competitive advantages requires a dynamic process of accumulation and 
relocation of flexible and specialized resources, through the government’s capacity to integrate its industry in 
global production networks and to promote and enhance geographical specificities. In this model, Lazzarini 
explicitly believes that competitive advantage depends on policy-making capabilities. In fact, it is acknowledged 
that the success of industrial policies depends on the relevance of political stability, which favors the government’s 
ability to direct public efforts towards management and exploitation of resources. This is achieved through 
programs and plans, and through the government’s evaluation of whether its policies are effective or not, so as to 
determine the required policy readjustments in the future. Therefore, government officials should be qualified 
(based on skilled technical staff with superior analytical capabilities) and prepared to analyze global and local 
trends, anticipate and influence change, and take the right decisions (Lazzarini, 2012, 2015). They should also be 
able to determine the private sector's needs, differentiating legitimate needs from unjustified demands, in order to 
reduce the risk of policy capture by private interests. 
 
3. Industrialization in an uncommon reality: disputed or occupied territories    
In this section, we will discuss how industrial development has occurred in geographical contexts with problems 
of political stability, specifically, disputed or occupied territories. For this purpose, four case studies were selected, 
all considered by Staff (2011) as in the top-ranking of the most relevant regions that globally have on-going 
territorial disputes and political controversy: 
- Northern Cyprus corresponds to the portion of the island of Cyprus occupied by Turkey, where it maintains a 
large military force. The territory is only recognized as a country by Turkey, whereas the international community 
considers it to be part of the Republic of Cyprus. 
- Taiwan is a disputed territory whose independence is not formally recognized by the majority of world countries 
(it is not a member of the United Nations), as China has consistently claimed sovereignty over this island.  
- Tibet is an occupied territory that pursues sovereignty and independence from China. With a huge number of 
refugees spread across the world, it faces significant migration from Chinese people who have been encouraged 
to settle in Tibet as an occupation strategy. 
- The West Bank is a territory where the Palestinian National Authority only has limited autonomy and control 
over some specific locations within its boundaries, as it is under the effective sovereignty and foreign power of 
Israeli occupation. 
 
3.1 The Northern Cyprus experience    
Cyprus is a small island in the Mediterranean Sea, where there has been an historical identity dispute between 
Turkey and Greece: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (UPEI, 2007). In 1974, Turkey occupied the northern 
part of the island of Cyprus and, subsequently, Cyprus was divided into two parts: the Republic of Cyprus, which 
is a legitimate member of the United Nations and of the European Union, and Northern Cyprus, which occupies 
35% of the island and whose independence legitimacy is only recognized by Turkey (Abdel-Ati, 2008). This island 
still faces today a political conflict between the two main segments of the island's population. The Turkish army 
keeps a large military force in Northern Cyprus which the Republic of Cyprus regards as an occupation force, 
present on the island since 1974, when around 160 thousand people (amounting to one third of the Greek Cypriot 
population) were expelled from the occupied northern part of the island, losing their homes, businesses, lands and 
other possessions (MFA, 2016). 
Due to its lack of sovereignty recognition, Northern Cyprus is strongly dependent on Turkey, not only for 
military and political support, but also in its economy. Since the Turkish occupation, Northern Cyprus’s economy 
is weak due to limited access to natural resources, but especially because of the international embargo imposed by 
the Republic of Cyprus and the United Nations member states. Consequently, Northern Cyprus is prevented from 
developing political and economic relations with countries other than Turkey (Katircioglu, 2006), preventing it 
from entering in global production networks and, therefore, from participating in and benefiting from the 
challenges of economic globalization.  
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However, and according to the World Bank (2006) and to Katircioglu, Arasli and Ekiz (2007), despite the 
constraints imposed by the lack of international recognition, Northern Cyprus has achieved a degree of growth in 
terms of GDP, with a real average of 3% per year over the period from 1977 to 2004. This economic growth is 
divided into four periods. The first period faced stagnant growth between 1977 and 1981, with GDP growth around 
0.8% per year. The second phase experienced relatively rapid growth, between 1981 and 1991, with GDP growth 
around 5.3% per year. The third phase, between 1991 and 2001, experienced moderate growth. In the fourth phase, 
after 2002, there was rapid recovery from recession with GDP growth above 10% per year (World Bank, 2006). 
This evolution is closely related with Turkey’s economic performance, and the relative stability of the Turkish 
Lira, as Northern Cyprus uses this currency, strongly linking its economy to that of Turkey’s. Hence, Northern 
Cyprus is clearly heavily dependent on the Turkish economy, not to mention that it is still dependent on monetary 
transfers from the Turkish government. 
According to SPO (2002), Northern Cyprus’s workforce reached 43.7% of the total population, of which 
19.6 % belonged to the service sector; 15.8% to agriculture sector; 15.3% to construction and 11.4% to the tourism 
and trade sectors. While the industrial sector accounted for just around 9.6% of the total workforce, composed 
mainly of food, textile and clothing manufacturing goods, to be consumed in the local market. Northern Cyprus 
has been unable to improve its industry production due to its political isolation, and most consumption goods are 
imported from other countries. In fact, after the occupation, Northern Cyprus’s economy, dominated by the 
services sector, experienced a change from production-oriented toward an import-based economy (Katircioglu, 
2006).  
In terms of the trade, Gunçavdi and Kucukcifci (2009) mentioned that if there is an embargo constraint on 
exports from Northern Cyprus, there are less restrictive policies on imports from Turkey, and from other foreign 
countries. In fact, the difference between import expenditures and export earnings have been expanding 
enormously with a huge increase in imports, specifically after 2001, benefiting from the GDP growth rates 
recorded in the Northern Cypriot economy. The ratio of imports to exports was approximately 18:1 in 2007 
(Pelagidis, Theophanous, and Tirkides, 2008), as a direct result of trade restrictions, which caused an isolation of 
Northern Cyprus from global markets with the sole exception of commercial relations with Turkey. 
As mentioned previously, in terms of economic activities, Northern Cyprus’s economy has clearly shifted 
from agriculture and manufacturing activities to the service sector, such as tourism, transportation, education and 
telecommunications. It is relevant to note that revenues in the manufacturing sector decreased from 13.4% in 1980 
to 9% in 2006, and the percentage of manufacturing in total output decreased from 18.4% in 1980 to 8.5% in 2006 
(Pelagidis, Theophanous, and Tirkides, 2008). In addition, Safakli (2011) stated that the ratio of bank loans in 
terms of fixed capital investment regarding the industry sector, declined from 30.7% in 2002 to around 4% in 2007. 
In this context, a shrinking industrial sector is, according to the World Bank (2006), a consequence of the weak 
investment climate in Northern Cyprus, caused by its political instability, responsible for trade restrictions on 
Northern Cypriot goods in the global markets. In fact, according to Safakli (2011), the main obstacle preventing 
industrial sector development in Northern Cyprus is precisely the lack of economic and political stability, which 
is responsible for investor behavior, shifting from risk in the industrial sector to service activities, such as hotel 
management and the restaurant chain business.  
It is important to add that the weak development of the industrial sector is also a consequence of the increasing 
role of the public sector in the local economy. As the government policy regarding expansion of employment and 
high wages in the public sector, a consequence of spending a large share of the financial aid from Turkey on public 
administration since 1974 (Katircioglu, 2006), led to distortions in the labor market, which had a negative impact 
on the industrial investment climate in Northern Cyprus. Other obstacles to industrial sector competitiveness are 
related with a small local market, around 280 thousand inhabitants (the small scale of the domestic market), which 
is not attractive to new investments (World Bank, 2006). According to Safakli (2011), it is also important to 
underline fund raising problems faced by private enterprises, which is responsible for the lack of new investment, 
or innovative technical development, as most factories use obsolete or antiquated machinery in comparison with 
their competitors, resulting in the decline of the quality standards of their industrial goods (Katircioglu, 2006). 
Additionally, the underdeveloped infrastructure should also be mentioned, namely in power supply, responsible 
for the high cost of electricity, twice higher than in Southern Cyprus (World Bank, 2006). All these constraints 
mean that, in terms of competition, manufacturing in Northern Cyprus has limited competitive advantage, 
especially as a result of its low productivity level and the international embargo. 
 
3.2 The Taiwan experience    
Taiwan is highly ranked globally in terms of economic growth and export volume, and it also stands out as one of 
the world's fastest rising territories in terms of living standards (Cheng, 2014). The unusually rapid and prolonged 
growth of exports in the four Asian tigers (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) has led many 
economists to analyze the secret of its success.  An example is the study by Young (1993), who provided evidence 
on the economic and development success of these economies. They have jumped several positions in GDP per 
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capita, raised real earnings and lowered their rates of poverty, and whose achievements are far ahead of those of 
other developing countries with more available natural resources. Wade (1990) concluded that the industrial 
transformation achieved by these countries had taken much less time in comparison to some developed countries 
earlier, stating that Taiwan had achieved in 15 years that which took Japan 25 years. According to Rodrick (1995), 
Taiwan experienced average increases of 6.2% in per-capita income between 1960 and 1989, mainly because it 
adopted industrial policies of production for export in the early nineteen sixties. The export/GDP ratio rose from 
around 10% in 1952 to over 50% in the mid-1980s, which led to a rise in income, savings, productivity and 
investment. During this period and as a consequence of the rising standards of living, the population increased 
from 7.5 million in 1950 to 20 million in 1990, and it reached 23 million in 2012 (UN, 2014). 
Taiwan is considered an important strategic location as it dominates the sea passages that link Northeast Asia 
to Southeast Asia (Polin, 2011), a feature that had long drawn the attention of Japan. Taiwan was part of the 
Chinese empire until the Chinese-Japanese war in 1894-1895 (Pastreich, 2003), after which Taiwan was occupied 
by the Japanese until 1945. Japan’s occupation for half a century had a positive impact on the development of 
Taiwan. According to Nafziger (1995), it was responsible for the rehabilitation of Taiwan’s agriculture and the 
improvement of irrigation systems, which contributed to an increase in production and, consequently, to tax 
increases. This tax revenue was later used in the establishment of industrial projects and spent on education and 
health. Japanese colonization further improved and expanded the infrastructure of road transportation, services, 
telecommunications, marketing services, and the provision of basic education for farmers. This latter aspect 
particularly provided them with management skills, which was important to raise their willingness to accept 
technological changes in agriculture, which in turn contributed to raising the degree of local economic/social 
progress. Goldstein (2001) considered that all this organizational and administrative discipline created a 
community ready to receive manufacturing development in the following years. In addition, it is important to 
highlight that the Japanese used a large part of the agricultural production surplus in the establishment of many 
factories in Taiwan, especially in the food industry, which multiplied the number of factories seven-fold during 
the period from 1915 to 1940, and the industrial labor force six-fold during the same period (Nafziger, 1995). Thus, 
Taiwan was under Japanese domination in its economic take-off stage, and benefited from it by gaining financial, 
technical and technological assistance, which was not the case of many other developing countries under 
occupation regimes. As Schafferer (2016: 74) states “Japanese colonialism in Taiwan not only benefitted Imperial 
Japan, it also improved the economic and social conditions of the Taiwanese, significantly changed the social 
structure of Taiwanese society, brought about an efficient state bureaucracy, and laid the foundation for Taiwan 
postwar economic success story”. 
Following the Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945 and Taiwan’s separation from Communist China in 
1949, Taiwan became fully self-governing. However, China has consistently claimed sovereignty over Taiwan 
and has threatened the use of military force in response to any formal declaration of independence by Taiwan, as 
well as refusing diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes Taiwan as an independent state. 
Consequently, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and only a few smaller nations recognize it.  
According to Young (1993), it was already under the politically unstable but fully self-governing phase in the 
early 1950s that Taiwan began the most important phase of its industrial development, which can be divided into 
two stages (Mathews, 2005). The first stage extended from the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 to the late 
1950s, when the Taiwanese government imposed restrictions on imports in order to encourage the local industry, 
and also focused on support for small and medium-sized manufacturing industries. During this stage, the land 
reform program was launched, enabling tenant farmers to own agricultural land, with the aim of increasing 
productivity. This measure also increased the yield surplus, which would revert in favor of the state, to be used in 
the industrial development process in Taiwan. Those policies that relied on nurturing industry with agriculture and 
developing agriculture with industry, contributed, according to Fei (1979), to laying the foundation for rapid 
industrial development in Taiwan. Consequently, the composition of exports changed from 85% in agricultural 
goods in 1955 to more than 90% in industrial goods in 1980 (Wade, 1990). 
The second stage started during the nineteen sixties and seventies, in which Taiwan shifted from an import 
substitution strategy towards an export promotion strategy, establishing subcontract arrangements with large 
industrial firms in the USA and Europe. In addition, it rescinded the restrictions on imports in order to facilitate 
the import of raw materials and machinery (Mathews, 2005). Moreover, the government of Taiwan established 
special industrial zones, with modern facilities served by high-quality infrastructural networks (such as roads, 
railways, airports, ports, power plants, telecommunications, etc.) and by research institutions and technological 
centers, which aimed to attract foreign industrial investments, as well as absorb foreign industrial technologies as 
a means to transfer innovation to the local economy (Noland and Pack, 2003). Based on this export promotion 
strategy, Taiwan encouraged the establishment of more sophisticated industries, such as the steel industry, 
petrochemicals, and electronic equipment. This integrated strategy allowed the Taiwanese industries to grow, 
evolve and become more competitive in international markets, as well as to satisfy the needs of the local market.  
As a result of these industrial policies, Taiwan experienced a marked increase in its exports; while 
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manufactured goods accounted for less than 8% of total exports in 1955, it had reached more than 91% by 1976 
(Liang and Mei, 2005). Several additional and complementary factors contributed to this successful experience. 
Taiwan as an island has many coastlines and many important commercial ports located on the global trade routes 
in Southeast Asia, which provides ease of access to the raw materials needed for its industry, as well as to the 
shipment of its industrial products. Taiwan also had an abundance of skilled and cheap labor (especially female), 
and an absence of labor regulations that did not specify a minimum wage, which provided a suitable investment 
environment to attract foreign investment, especially from multinational companies to take advantage of these 
features.  
According to Liang and Mei (2005), Taiwan’s economic growth was based on the dramatic growth of its 
industry, especially when Taiwan shifted towards capital-intensive and high-tech production instead of labor-
intensive manufacturing. The government adopted a policy of identifying and promoting strategic industries. In 
the 1980s, it embarked on a development program designed to shift the economy from reliance on labor-intensive 
industries towards the development of technology-intensive products. As a result, the technology industry 
increasingly became the paramount engine of economic growth in Taiwan (Shin-Horng and Wen, 2007). In fact, 
Taiwan’s government is considered to have acted as a continuous facilitator of industrial growth in response to the 
pressures of technological upgrading (Smith, 1997), through human resources development and the funding of 
research centers and universities, which contributed to the strength of Taiwan’s IT (information technology) sector. 
Taiwan passed laws to encourage scientific research and established a number of offices and agencies to coordinate 
research. Furthermore, both the private and public sector spent relevant funds to bridge the gap which separated 
Taiwan from the developed countries in terms of technology and innovation (Wade, 2000). These systems and 
policies as a whole helped to attract foreign investment to Taiwan, apart from the advantages offered to the 
investors, such as exemption of customs fees, taxes and preferential funding treatment, storage and transportation 
services, and facilitated access to industrial sites (Rodrik, 1995). In addition, according to Yu (2001), Taiwanese 
IT companies also adopted policies based on encouraging employees by offering them bonuses and benefits which 
helped to increase the efficiency of production, encouraged competition and innovation among employees, as well 
as strengthened loyalty and devotion to the company. As a result, Mathews (2005) stated that Taiwan had grown 
to become the world's third largest producer, behind the USA and Japan, in IT products. 
By reviewing the Taiwanese industrial development experience, it is clear that there are many circumstances 
that made it unique, proving the good results of long-term planning and good usage of resources. Despite the 
political dispute over this territory, the local government benefited from full autonomy to define an industrial 
development and economic growth strategy and was able to pursue it fully.  
 
3.3 The Tibet experience      
Tibet is the highest region on Earth, located in the Tibetan Plateau in Asia, with borders with China, India, Burma, 
Nepal and Bhutan. It is under Chinese occupation since 1950 (CPIRC, 1991). Its population in 2011 reached 3 
million inhabitants, 90% of whom are Tibetan Buddhists, and the rest are immigrants, especially from Chinese 
regions (Guanqun, 2011). The conflict with China is mainly due to ethnic and religious reasons, as the Chinese 
government oppresses all the religious group movements which may convert to political movements, considering 
the Tibetan Buddhists one of them (Stokes, 2010). 
According to Davis (2009), the Tibetan government in exile argues that Tibet is an independent nation with 
roots in a strong empire in the past, and the Chinese government exerts illegal control since 1950. Over time this 
position has received several relevant supporters, namely the United States, whose international policy during the 
Bush administrations encouraged Tibet to be independent and to put an end to Chinese control, in an attempt to 
weaken and destabilize the Chinese position (Dickinson, 2009). For its part, the Chinese government argues that 
Tibet’s failure to establish itself as a recognized and modernized nation in the first half of the 20th century, and its 
failure to play a role in the international community, are reasons enough to keep Tibet under Chinese authority 
(Davis, 2009). Moreover, there are Chinese concerns about its sovereignty and control over Tibet, as if the Chinese 
government allow Tibet any level of independence, it could encourage other regions, such as Inner Mongolia or 
Xinjiang, to also demand their independence from China, which could affect Chinese control over these important 
borders provinces. 
In relation to the Tibetan economy, Goldscheider (1995) mentioned that for many centuries the major 
economic activities were traditional agriculture and animal production, as nearly 70% of Tibet is grassland. But in 
the 1980s, new economic policies were launched for Tibet’s modernization and economic development, focusing 
particularly on the agricultural and industrial sector. The agricultural sector started using chemical fertilizers, 
machinery and modern technology to increase production in rural areas. Furthermore, the alliance between the 
central government in China and the local government in Tibet played a significant role in industrial sector growth, 
as the Chinese government supported and helped the Tibetan industrial sector to improve its productivity, not only 
by increasing expenditures on the creation of industrial units (government expenditures on industrial units 
increased from 220 thousand CNY in 1952 to 182.39 million in 1995); but also through industrial production 
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subsidies and price subsidies over industrial goods (SBT, 1996). This support to the industrial sector was also 
accompanied by improved transportation conditions and special conditions to facilitate the acquisition of new 
machinery and modern technology.  
This industrial development in Tibet after the 1980s enhanced trade movements, not only within Tibet but 
especially between Tibet and neighboring Chinese regions. Not so relevant, but increasing, are trade relations with 
other countries. In fact, if in 1956, the proportion of Tibetan industrial production sold outside Tibet was 2.3% and 
in 1990 it was 10.4% (SBT, 1989, 1996). This trend indicates that Tibet’s industrial production is still mainly for 
domestic consumption. However, economic relations between Tibet and Chinese regions are becoming more 
intense, at the same time as Tibet has also started to take part in economic globalization processes and benefited 
from international trade relations with other countries, which is enabling its industrial sector development. 
According to Fish (2010), the good results in industrial production occurred because the Chinese government 
helped Tibetan economic growth, in a first phase, by strongly investing in its infrastructures and in the 
modernization of the remote parts of Tibet. In a second phase, after 2006, the Chinese government changed its 
development policy from funding infrastructure projects to several programs aiming to achieve greater and broader 
benefits for the Tibetan inhabitants.  But from the Tibetan point of view, the Chinese immigrants in Tibet have 
been the first beneficiaries of these investments (Karan, 2004), as the Chinese government has given incentives 
for massive Chinese migration to Tibet, in a strategy to promote its cultural assimilation (the sinicization of Tibet). 
The government of Tibet in exile claims that all these investments are mainly an attempt to cause the disappearance 
of elements of the Tibetan culture, causing what can be called a cultural genocide (Dawa, 2001). From this 
perspective, a range of economic, social, cultural and political reforms have been introduced in Tibet by the 
Chinese government intended above all to make Tibet resemble Chinese society and, in this way, control the desire 
for Tibetan self-determination. 
Mingqing (2010) studied the impact of these reforms and openness policy on the characteristics of Tibet's 
industrial structure, which has becoming driven by modern and large-size enterprises, especially in mining and 
quarrying, building materials and the agro-food industry, concluding that the modification of Tibet's industrial 
structure has played an important role in its economic growth. In part derived from Tibet’s fast-growing modern 
industry, the average annual growth rate of GDP increased by 9.21% over the period from 2006 to 2014, which is 
related with an annual growth rate of Tibet's industry output of around 15.2% from 2006 to 2014 (Yang and Shi, 
2016). Tibet has revealed a better performance over time in its industrial labor productivity, a consequence 
particularly of government investments over the past three decades, when Tibet started to develop and upgrade its 
industrial structure, by creating several technological development centers, such as the Nagqu Logistics Center 
and Technological Development, as well as several industrial zones with different functions, such as the Nyingchi 
Biotechnology Industrial zone (Dolma, 2016).  
Despite this industrial development, the Tibetan Buddhists still feel that they are oppressed in their own land 
as a result of the government-sponsored migration of a large number of Han Chinese (an ethnic group native to 
East Asia) to the Tibetan Region, as a major component of Tibet sinicization. In fact, there is a Han monopoly in 
industrial jobs, making it difficult for Tibetan Buddhists to get those employment opportunities (Wong, 2009). 
Moreover, Bhattacharya (2007) found that 85% of Tibet's population lives in absolute poverty and only 15% of 
the population benefits from the Chinese government's economic projects. So, Tibet as an occupied territory is 
facing industrial development with good results but with no social justice, as it is characterized by ethnic 
segregation in the benefits brought from this industrial development.  
 
3.4 The West Bank (Palestine) experience      
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Jewish state increased its surface by nearly 6428 sq. km in comparison 
with the land approved in the United Nation’s Partition Plan of 1947. Therefore, the Jewish territories expanded 
into the equivalent of 76.9% of the total land area of former Palestine (Ennab, 1979). This meant the Arabs were 
only able to keep 23.1% of the total area “spread over the West Bank with 5876 sq. km and the Gaza Strip with 
363 sq. km" (Ennab, 1979, p. 8). Later, the 1967 ‘Six Days War’ resulted in Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank (Kersel, 2008). The West Bank corresponds generally to the central mountains of former Palestine, 
consisting of a high plateau featuring some plains enclosed between the mountains of Nablus in the north, and the 
mountains of Jerusalem and Hebron in the south (Al-Khatib, 2005). In comparison to Israeli territory, the West 
Bank is much less fertile, with poor natural resources and with low quality road infrastructures due to the rough 
terrain. Despite that, many Israeli colonies were established on mountain tops to exploit the water springs and to 
facilitate control and monitoring of the Palestinian cities. At the end of 2013, there were registered 148 colonies 
in the West Bank, home of around 580 thousand Jews (PCBS, 2013). 
Following the 1967 War, the Israeli authorities worked in various ways, through a series of military and 
administrative procedures, to weaken the Palestinian economy in general and the Palestinian industry in particular, 
damaging its ability to keep pace with the industrial developments that were occurring in neighboring countries. 
Several studies (Roy, 1989, 1991; Abu Ashokr et al., 1991; Barakat, 2015, Aburaida, 2017) have analyzed the 
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most relevant constraints imposed by Israeli occupation to weaken the West Bank’s industry, namely:  
- the imposition on Palestinian industrial firms of several taxes and fees to cover the expenses of the 
occupation, and transfer of the surplus to the treasury of the Israeli government, a political decision that has 
promoted unfair competition as it has increased the costs of production and, consequently, the final price of 
Palestinian industrial goods; 
- The control and exploration of the most relevant Palestinian natural resources (land confiscation and 
control of water resources) reducing their contribution to the West Bank economic growth. 
- The depletion of the West Bank’s human resources, as during this period Israel absorbed part of the local 
workforce with the opening of the Israeli industrial colonies (inside the West Bank), which became much more 
attractive to Palestinian workers (due to well-paid wages) and caused negative repercussions on the local economy, 
namely with the depletion of the more skilled workforce. 
- The disinvestment in local infrastructures, as Israel has neglected any investment programs to improve 
Palestinian mobility infrastructure in the West Bank, except those whose purpose it is to serve the Israeli colonies 
located in those occupied territories. 
- The creation of obstacles to international trade between the occupied territories and neighboring Arab 
countries, as a way to maintain the West Bank isolated from external influences and limit the growth of its 
industries. 
As a result of the negative influences of these actions on the social and economic life of the Palestinians, the 
First Intifada against Israel lasted for six years and ended in 1993. Although the Oslo Accords of 1993, a peace 
treaty promoted by the United Nations, formally ended the Israeli invasion with the establishment of the Palestinian 
National Authority (Naqib, 2003), the presence of the Israeli army has been maintained to the present day, 
throughout the West Bank, even in those territories (mainly West Bank cities) where the Palestinian Authority is 
supposed to have full administrative control (PCHR, 2016). In fact, Israel still does not recognize the Palestinian 
National Authority’s sovereignty over its territory, even after the United Nations (UN) changed Palestine’s status 
to a ‘non-member observer state’ in 2012 and decided that the designation of the ‘State of Palestine’ should be 
used in all official UN documents (UN, 2012), and even though 136 in a total of 193 UN member states have 
already recognized the State of Palestine. 
More recently, and in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, Israel built a long wall which has isolated the 
West Bank. Moreover, several Israeli checkpoints were created that have isolated towns and villages in the West 
Bank in order to impose control directly on the ground and prevent the movement of citizens and goods. These 
political decisions have contributed to the destruction of economic and social life on several levels, such as, for 
instance, preventing access of farmers to their lands, restricting the movement of citizens, creating obstacles to the 
transport of raw materials and manufacturing goods, as well as agricultural products. These constraints also arise 
from the Palestinian National Authority’s lack of control over its borders, which creates several obstacles to its 
industry, which have been summarized by Aburaida (2017). First, obstacles to importing/acquiring raw materials, 
as more than 87% of the West Bank industries are totally dependent on imported raw materials. This increases 
local production costs as those firms need to support high taxes to use Israeli ports and harbors to import raw 
materials. Second, obstacles to selling West Bank goods in local and foreign markets, as more than 83% of its 
industrial production is sold only inside the West Bank. The reduced export share of the West Bank economy is a 
direct consequence of Israeli control over West Bank international trade, as the Palestinian exports must go through 
Israeli ports to get to other foreign markets. Here, the Standards Institution of Israel (SII) imposes high standards 
specifications on Palestinian products in order for them to be accepted to be exported to Israel and to international 
markets. Moreover, the Protocol on Economic Relations (or Paris Protocol), which was an imposition by Israel to 
sign the Oslo Peace Agreement, is a regulative protection against Arab products and a means to keep the Palestinian 
market mostly open to Israeli products. So, it has created the opportunity for Israeli products to invade the 
Palestinian market and, moreover, it prevents Palestinian products from entering the Israeli market. As a 
consequence, the Palestinian economy annually imports 5.5 billion US dollars’ worth of products, 4 billion of 
which are spent on importing products from Israel, while the Palestinian export volume does not exceed 800 
million US dollars. Thus, the Palestinian economy loses at least 4 billion US dollars a year (Walwil, 2014), a 
deficit that causes damage at several levels of the local economy and severely affects employment opportunities. 
In addition, not only are local firms conditioned to sell almost all their production inside the West Bank, but a 
large majority only explores the geographical market around the firm’s location (Aburaida, 2017), a consequence 
of the checkpoints between villages and cities, which impedes business owners from selling their products in more 
distant cities in the West Bank.  
With the emergence of the Palestinian National Authority, the West Bank’s industrial sector faced a new 
opportunity for development. However, Nasr (1997) argued that the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority did not cause the expected development of the Palestinian industrial sector. Awdi and Ahmed 
(2008) also argued that some of the most important obstacles to the West Bank industry are due to a lack of 
coordination, follow-up and supervision from the official authorities, the lack of expenditure on infrastructural 
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projects by the Palestinian Authority, the total dependence on donor countries to finance new investments, in 
addition to bureaucratic complexities that restrict the funding of local infrastructure. In fact, not all obstacles faced 
by the West Bank’s firms arise from external influence. It is also important to underline the lack of support from 
the Palestinian National Authority for the local industry. There is, nevertheless, an Investment Promotion Law that 
regulates the process of granting public incentives to attract new industrial investments, yet it is especially target 
at supporting relatively large investments, which are not common in the West Bank economy (Odah and Ahmed, 
2008). Another obstacle is related with the absence of industrial parks and difficult access to property by firm 
owners/managers to invest in more appropriate facilities. It is important to remember that, under the Oslo 
Agreement, the area defined as fully controlled by the Palestinian National Authority represents only 3% of the 
West Bank’s total area. In a reality where the majority of the local firms are located in residential areas (half of 
them in buildings that combine industrial and residential functions), the land problem raises difficulties to 
industrial development (Aburaida, 2017). The local government has not invested in the creation of adequate, 
conveniently planned industrial parks, where industrial owners could build their facilities with better infrastructural 
conditions, as well as better conditions to incorporate more modern and efficient production technologies. It should 
be noted that the land problem is one of the most relevant reasons behind firm owners’ decisions to not invest in 
more modern and technologically sophisticated machinery, as they believe that those technological investments 
are not feasible with the poor, inappropriate factory facilities where their firms are installed.  
To sum up, over the course of the long-standing dispute between the occupiers and the occupied, Israel turned 
the West Bank into both a source of cheap labor and a trade arena for its products. In addition, Israel imposed 
major restraints on Palestinian economic activities, specifically industrial ones, which are still today retracting its 
growth and competitiveness (Epstein, 2002). The economic problems that were created by this occupation have 
been intensified by depleting Palestinian financial resources, through a forced and oppressive tax policy both on 
individuals and industrial plants (Aburaida, 2017). Consequently, all these practices have resulted in weak 
opportunities for developing the Palestinian production base, specifically its industrial sector, which does not even 
have the possibility to benefit from its more qualified workforce, as they have been drawn to firms located in Israel 
or in the Israeli colonies inside the West Bank. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Industrial development and how it can be influenced by government decisions has received scant attention in those 
territories where governments are limited in their actions, namely disputed or occupied territories, suffering on-
going conflicts and political instability. The absence of a broader reflection on the specificities of this particular 
context provided the opportunity to look at some international cases and their industrial policies. From this 
comparative analysis, it can be stated that in disputed or occupied territories there are some specificities and 
similarities between the factors that play a significant role in the success/failure of their industrial policies with 
regard to broader development goals. Those factors seem to be: the level of political stability and autonomy of the 
local government in defining and pursuing development goals; the influence of past and current occupations and 
their strategic orientation: more segregationist or more integrated; the influence of protectionist orientations 
especially during the first stages of industrialization, as well as of the agricultural investments with benefits in the 
external balance of payments; the ability to attract foreign investment as a means to transfer innovation and 
technology to the local economy; and the level of openness of the local economy conjugated with the ability to 
increase local industrial productivity and competitiveness and, thus, increase exports.  
If Taiwan was able to successfully implement industrial policies and promote its industrial competitiveness, 
that is related with the past period of occupation by Japan, having taken a different approach from many other 
cases of occupation worldwide. Japan invested massive funds in the island with a positive impact on its 
development. For instance, the Japanese rehabilitation of Taiwanese agriculture and the related revenues, as well 
as infrastructural and educational improvements, were both crucial for later investments in industrial projects. Also, 
Taiwanese firm owners’ willingness to accept technological changes came from management practices introduced 
during the Japanese colonization. Thus, the strategic orientation of the occupation seemed to have had a significant 
influence on the success of industrial policies later. The policies launched after the beginning of sovereignty 
problems with China, were, in a first stage, based on an import substitution strategy, which imposed restrictions 
on imports to encourage and nurture the local industry. In a second stage, Taiwan shifted towards an export 
promotion strategy, first by establishing subcontract arrangements with foreign firms; and later, after investments 
in high-quality industrial parks, infrastructures, research and technological development centers, Taiwan started 
to attract relevant foreign investment as a means to transfer innovation and technology to the local economy, which 
promoted a marked increase in its exports, initially in capital and labor-intensive industries. These good results 
were used later by the government to support a policy of promoting competitive advantages in strategic industries, 
allowing the economy to shift from reliance on labor-intensive industries to the development of technology-
intensive products (IT and electronic equipment industry). This strategic guidance was supported by 
complementary political measures that tried to increase productivity and competitiveness, by encouraging and 
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pushing companies to raise their performances: through human resources development and motivation; through 
innovative management consulting services; or through a system of incentives to encourage research and 
development. This integrated strategy allowed Taiwanese industries to grow, evolve and become amongst the most 
competitive in international markets. 
This specific geographical context has benefited from a highly autonomous government to define industrial 
development and economic growth strategy from the inside, which is not the most common circumstance in 
disputed territories. On the contrary, the case of Tibet is an example of an industrial policy defined from the outside. 
China has made huge investments in Tibet’s economy, but the main purpose is not to increase its economic growth 
and promote social cohesion, but rather as a tool of a broader strategy to oppress its cultural identity. The Chinese 
government has given incentives for massive Chinese migration to Tibet, in a strategy to promote its cultural 
assimilation (the sinicization of Tibet), and these new Chinese residents are the ones who have benefited the most 
from the industrial job creation. The Chinese government initially devoted more attention to increasing the 
productivity of the agricultural sector (similarly to the Taiwanese case), with the application of new farming 
procedures and technologies. At the same time, a number of protectionists measures were applied to favor the 
development of local industries (also similar to Taiwan), through public funds to support the creation of new 
industrial units, and through industrial production subsidies and price subsidies over industrial goods. Investments 
were also directed at improving local infrastructures and the technological development of firms. Concurrently, 
incentives appeared to increase trade relations beyond the local market and especially with Chinese regions, which 
was a relevant driver for Tibet’s industrial sector development. As a consequence, Tibet has revealed a better 
performance over time in its industrial labor productivity, with a positive impact on the average annual growth 
rate of GDP, but with criticized results in what concerns its impact on a social and cultural approach of 
development. 
In the case of Northern Cyprus, the industrial sector has also benefited from investments from the occupiers. 
However, in this case, the social and cultural impact on the population has not been negative (as in the case of 
Tibet), as there is a cultural proximity between the occupier and the majority of the current inhabitants: Turkish 
Cypriots. But this has only occurred because thousands of Greek Cypriots were expelled from the occupied 
northern part of the island during the invasion, losing their homes, lands and possessions. Northern Cyprus, under 
political and economic isolation, has been unable to improve its industrial production. In fact, a shrinking industrial 
sector is the result of the weak investment climate in Northern Cyprus, caused by political instability, and 
responsible for trade restrictions on Northern Cypriot goods in the global market, which impede its exports. On 
the other hand, government policy regarding expansion of employment in the public sector has led to distortions 
in the labor market, which has a negative impact on the industrial investment climate in Northern Cyprus. Currently, 
Northern Cyprus is a closed economy that does not benefit from all the challenges of economic globalization, 
similar to the case of the West Bank, but motivated by different causes. Northern Cyprus suffers from an 
international embargo, which means it is only able to establish international trade relations with Turkey. But in 
this case (as with Tibet), the occupier is not trying to explore the weaker economy unfairly, as is the case of trade 
relations between the West Bank and Israel.  
In the specific context of the West Bank, local firms face a closed, blockade economy, resulting from 
restrictions on imports of raw materials from other countries than Israel, difficulties in importing machinery and 
technologies; difficulties in exporting to Israel and to other destinations; difficulties in attracting foreign direct 
investment; and difficulties in exploring the local market by selling local production in the all West Bank. 
Furthermore, the West Bank is still under Israeli occupation, and the Palestinian National Authority has limited 
power on the ground to fight against the unfair competition felt by local products, as a result of the increase in its 
production costs due to all the limitations imposed by the Israeli occupation. Thus, being a closed economy under 
the influence of unfair competition, local firms expect a favorable economic policy from the Palestinian Authority 
that could protect local production. In fact, in the West Bank, there are a number of problems that hinder local 
industrial performance, which could be mitigated by a public policy designed to help improve these firms’ 
performance. According to Aburaida (2017), the high priority of this public policy, from the firm owners/managers’ 
perspective, should be related to political measures to help integrate these firms in international trade, in order to 
finally allow entry of the West Bank’s industry into the globalized economy. For instance, measures to help expand 
the market for Palestinian goods, with international promotion actions and other complementary measures that 
could facilitate the export of local production. It should not be forgotten that exportation is currently absent from 
more than 98% of West Bank firms, if we exclude the Israel market. Furthermore, industrial owners/managers feel 
government support should give top priority to the qualification of local human resources, which is considered 
crucial by firm owners to improve production processes and increase the competitiveness of local industry. Finally, 
infrastructural political measures were identified as essential to help firms expand/modernize their facilities, or to 
assist firm owners to acquire land in order to build new and more appropriate facilities. This obstacle is related 
with the absence of high-quality industrial zones, which restricts access to appropriate facilities which could allow 
local firms to conveniently perform their production processes, as well as to invest in adequate technology, and 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.1, 2018 
 
19 
therefore enhance industrial competitiveness.   
It is important to emphasize that disputed and occupied territories are not homogenous entities in reacting to 
prescribed polices. Besides differences between being disputed territory or being occupied, with clear 
repercussions in the level of autonomy over its industrial policy, also the territory size, geographic location, initial 
economic conditions, the type of political relation with the occupier, and a host of other factors (history, 
demography, if the occupiers have the same or a different cultural background, the possibilities for trade, etc.) play 
a significant role in the success or failure of industrial polices, as this study amply shows. Nevertheless, despite 
the heterogeneity of the four industrialization experiences analyzed, it can be suggested, as a hypothesis for further 
debate in future studies, that disputed or occupied territories that aim to create a dynamic and competitive industrial 
sector, with potential to contribute to economic and social development, should in a first stage consider the 
implementation of protectionist measures with restrictions on imports to encourage and nurture the local industry. 
However, and depending on the specificities of each case, those protectionist measures should be more or less 
intense according to the level of openness of the occupied territory’s economy, and also proportional to the level 
of autonomy and sovereignty of the local governments. Concurrently, these protectionist measures should be 
applied at the same time as multiple efforts are made to create an attractive environment for foreign investors and 
to move towards an export orientation strategy. From the international experiences analyzed, it seems that an 
appropriate government strategy intended to achieve industrial growth in these specific geographical contexts, 
must pay special attention to the policy of import substitution, combined with political efforts intended to develop 
the local industry in order to be able to compete abroad in the globalized economy. 
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